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Abstract 
 
We build on existing literature and contemporary challenges to African development to assess the 
role of political stability in fighting corruption and boosting corruption-control in 53 African 
countries for the period 1996-2010. We postulate that on the one hand, an atmosphere of political 
instability should increase the confidence of impunity owing to less corruption-control. On the 
other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political instability further fuels 
corruption. Our findings validate both hypotheses. Hence, contrary to a stream of the literature, 
we establish causal evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no violence 
and corruption-control (corruption). The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Methods of 
Moments. The findings are robust to contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. 
The political stability estimates are consistently significant with decreasing (increasing) 
magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of corruption (corruption-control). In other 
words, the positive responsiveness of corruption-control to political stability is an increasing 
function of corruption-control while the negative responsiveness of corruption to political 
stability is a decreasing function of corruption. Simply put: a good turn deserves another.   
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1. Introduction 
 The April 2015 World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has 
revealed that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of most 
African countries. According to the narrative, about 45% of countries in the sub-Saharan African 
region are still substantially off-track from reaching the MDGs extreme poverty target of halving 
poverty by 2015 from 1990 (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015). Political instability and corruption 
have been documented to represent substantial challenges to lifting the continent from its poverty 
tragedy (Amavilah, 2015).  
In North Africa, the Arab Spring of 2011 is still exerting substantial negative externalities 
in terms of political instability and/or prospects for political instability. Consistent with Asongu 
et al. (2015) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015), recent evidence of these tendencies can be 
summarized in seven main points. First, in the post-Gaddafi era, Libya has become a failed state, 
characterized by complete societal breakdown and anarchy, with a plethora of rebel factions and 
two rival governments fighting desperately to dictate the law of the land. Second, the 2013 
Westgate shopping mall and 2015 Garissa university killings in Kenya by Al-Shabab have shown 
that the Somali Al-Quaeda affiliated Al-Shabab can still inflict substantial political instability 
challenges in the sub-region. Third, in Tunisia, after the couple of political assassinations that 
have characterised the post-Arab Spring era, the newly democratically elected government is now 
facing a wave of attacks from Islamic fundamentalists, namely, the: Sousse and Bardo National 
Museum attacks in June and March 2015 respectively. Fourth, the Boko Haram of Nigeria is 
currently extending its sphere of violence to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Niger and 
Chad. Fifth, in Burundi, a decision by President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in 
office has cast a shadow of political violence/instability across the country. Sixth, the South 
Sudanese political crisis and civil war which began in December 2013 has led to thousands of 
death and displaced hundreds of thousands of citizens in the country. Seven, the current political 
instability in the Central African Republic is not very different from experiences in the past, 
notably: (i) a plethora of failed coup d’états between 1996-2003 and (ii) the 2004-2007 Bush 
War.  
 The highlighted waves of political instability are reminiscent of the consequences of the 
political crises that have marred the continent’s development in a much recent past, notably: (i) 
the protracted politico-economic crisis in Zimbabwe; (ii) 2007/2008 post-election crisis in Kenya; 
4 
 
and (iii) Nigeria’s marred political transitions in 2008 and 2011. According to Asongu (2014a, p. 
1569), political strife has been the rule of the political game for decades in many African 
countries: Angola (1975-2002); Burundi (1993-2005); Chad (2005-2010); Côte d’Ivoire (with a 
resurrected crisis in 2011 after the 1999 coup d’état and 2002-2007 civil war); Liberia (1999-
2003); Sierra Leone (1991-2002); the Congo Democratic Republic; Somalia and Sudan (with 
carnages in Durfur). In summary, seven of the ten cases of total societal breakdown and chaos 
documented in contemporary development literature have been registered in Africa (with the 
exceptions of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan), namely: Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Zaire/Congo, Somalia, and Sudan (Asongu, 2014a). 
 Corruption that is relatively high in the African continent has been documented to exert 
substantial negative effects on development outcomes. According to Kodila-Tedika (2012a) and 
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2013), the debates on the consequences of corruption have included: 
(i) no impacts
1
, negative effects (Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011; Mo, 2001; Mauro, 1995) or positive 
impacts
2
 on investment and economic prosperity; (ii) slight weak impact of corruption on 
economic growth via the investment channel (Mauro, 1997); (iii) negative effect in specifically 
investment-oriented lines of inquiry (Everhart et al., 2009; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 
2008; Aysan et al., 2007; Brunetti et al., 1998; Mauro, 1997); (iv) perilous effect of foreign 
investment (Wei, 2000a) and bank credit (Ahlin & Pang, 2008; Wei & Wu, 2001; Wei, 2000b) in 
studies focused on capital flows; (v) negative return (De la Croix & Delavallade, 2007; Haque & 
Kneller, 2008) and quality (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) of public expenditure, particularly in general 
(Delavallade, 2006) and military (Gupta et al., 2001) expenditure and (vi) the depletion of 
governance income (Blackburn et al., 2008; Friedman et al., 2000; Ghura, 1998; Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 1997).  
 Other studies on the effects of the corruption have included: (i) neutrals (You & Khagram, 
2005) and pros
3
, in debates on the positive impact on poverty and inequality; (ii) the disincentives 
of the concern to education with respect to years of schooling (Mo, 2001), rates of registrations 
(Mokaddem, 2010; Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005) and ambitions of pursuing education to the 
research and postgraduate levels (Kodila-Tedika, 2012b); (iii) negative influence on corporate 
                                                 
1
 See Li et al. (2000)  and Brunetti et  al. (1998).  
2
 Marginal positive impacts are characteristics of countries with substantial institutional deficiency (Méon & Weill, 
2010; Aidt, 2009; Aidt et al., 2008; Houston, 2007).   
3
 See, amongst others: Li et  al. (2000), Gymiah-Brempong (2002),   Gupta et  al. (2002), You and Khagram (2005),  
Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2006) and  Dincer and Gunalp (2008).   
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productivity (De Rosa et al., 2010) and business climate (Dzhumashev, 2009); (iv) political 
violence (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004); (v)  perilous consequences on trade (Abe & Wilson,  
2008) and degradation of the environment (Smith et al., 2003; Welsch, 2004; Barbier, 2010) and 
(vi) solid linkages with shadow and underground economies (Friedman et  al., 2000) and strong 
likelihood for conflicts and crimes (Azfar & Gurgur, 2004;  Azfar, 2005; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2013,2016).  
 In light of the above, this policy note contributes to the literature by assessing the role of 
political stability on corruption and the control of corruption. Understanding this linkage is 
important because some contemporary African development literature has failed to establish the 
causality between variables of state fragility and corruption (Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe, 
2014)
4
. Contrary to the underlying literature, we postulate that there could be causality between 
political stability and corruption (and/or corruption-control) for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, an atmosphere of political instability should increase the confidence about less impunity 
and corruption-control because resources allocated in the fight against corruption may not be 
optimal. On the other hand, in the absence of such impunity from corruption, political instability 
further increases corruption. Hence, two hypotheses result from the postulation. First, political 
stability has a positive effect on corruption-control. Second, political stability decreases 
corruption.  
 It is important to investigate these hypotheses because the findings of the underpinning 
papers partially motivating this study could have an important influence on policy decisions. The 
rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The 
empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries with annual data from World Bank 
development indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity begins from 1996 because 
corruption, corruption-control and political stability indicators are only available from this period. 
The scope of the African continent is consistent with the underlying study partially motivating 
                                                 
4
 The paper has concluded: “Robust empirical evidence shows a correlation between the level of corruption and state 
fragility. In a further assessment with the econometrics of instrumental variables we ﬁnd evidence of causality 
neither ﬂowing from state fragility to classical corruption nor to extreme corruption” (p. 50).   
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this note (Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe, 2014). Political stability is measured with the 
political stability/non violence indicator from World Governance Indicators. The corruption and 
corruption-control indices that are employed as dependent variables are in accordance with the 
hypotheses stipulated in the introduction. We control for government expenditure, trade 
openness, GDP per capita growth, inflation and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the first-
three control variables have been adopted by Kodila-Tedika and Bolito-Losembe (2014), we have 
added the last-two for more subtlety in the analysis. Accordingly, the first specifications only 
involve the first-three while the last-two are included into the conditioning information set in the 
second specifications (see Table 1). 
 Before delving into the empirical specification, it is relevant to highlight the expected 
signs for the control variables. Government expenditure should increase corruption (Asongu & 
Jellal, 2013, p. 2196;  Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008). Trade openness decreases 
corruption (Asongu, 2014b; Asongu, 2012, p. 2178). Economic prosperity increases corruption 
(Asongu & Jellal, 2013, p. 2196; Asongu, 2013a, p. 63), decreases corruption-control (Asongu, 
2013b, p. 44) and per capita economic prosperity also increases corruption (Asongu, 2013c, p. 
16). The reverse effect is also true if: (i) the benefits of economic growth trickling-down through 
equitable distribution mechanisms eventually deter ‘corruption for survival’ and (ii) economic 
growth provides the much needed financial resources to implement control of corruption 
measures. From intuition, low inflation should be favorable to corruption-control while high 
inflation should not; essentially because in situations of soaring food prices, many citizens revert 
to corrupt means to make ends meet. Like trade openness, financial globalization (FDI) is also a 
powerful tool in the fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014b). The definition of the variables, 
summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and 
Appendix 3 respectively.  
 In accordance with Asongu (2013d), we adopt a system Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) for three main reasons: it controls for the potential endogeneity in all the regressors
5
, 
mitigates potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and, does not eliminate 
cross-country variations. Hence, we prefer the system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance 
                                                 
5
 The concern about endogeneity is even more relevant because of the established evidence on reverse causality, 
notably, studies that have concluded that corruption (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2013) and bad governance (Asongu 
& Kodila-Tedika, 2016) are causes of conflicts and crimes in Africa.   
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with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4). The two-step approach is preferred to the one-step because it 
controls for heteroscedasticity. Two tests are performed to assess the validity of the models. The 
Arellano and Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test and the Sargan  overidentifying restrictions 
(OIR) test for the absence of autocorrelation and validity of instruments respectively. We control 
for time-effects and ensure that the instruments are less than the number of cross-sections in the 
specifications by using three-year non-overlapping intervals. Hence, the basic condition for using 
a GMM technique has been met: N>T (53>5). We do not provide the equations in levels and first 
difference: (i) for brevity and lack of space and (ii) because the GMM estimation technique is 
standard and well known. However, details of the specifications and equations are available upon 
request.  
 
3. Empirical results  
 This section presents the findings of the two main hypotheses outlined in the introduction. 
As shown in Table 1 below, but for a thin exception (second specification of corruption 
perception index), the models are overwhelmingly valid. This is essentially because the null 
hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most part
6
. Contrary to the 
findings of the underlying paper, the two hypotheses are validated, notably: (1) political stability 
increases corruption-control and; (2) political stability mitigates corruption. In the interpretation 
of the incidence on corruption, note should be taken of the fact that the corruption perception 
index (CPI) which is our indicator for corruption is measured in decreasing order by 
Transparency International. Hence, high CPI values imply low levels of corruption. The 
significant control variable has the expected sign. Accordingly, trade openness is a good tool in 
the fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014b).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 It should be recalled that, in order to examine the validity of the models, we have performed two tests, notably the 
Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the 
Sargan-test which examines the over-identification restrictions. The latter test investigates if instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that the 
instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (that is, they do not suffer from endogeneity). We only report AR(2) in 
difference because it is more relevant than the AR(1) which detects autocorrelation in levels. Overwhelmingly for 
almost all estimated models, we are neither able to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation  
nor the Sargan null for the validity of the instruments.  
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Table 1: The effect of political stability on corruption and corruption-control  
         
 Corruption Perception Index(Corruption)  Corruption-Control  
         
Corruption (-1) 0.655*** 0.445*** 0.793*** 0.533*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.003)     
Corruption Control (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.967** 1.057*** 0.648** 0.620*** 
     (0.013) (0.000) (0.023) (0.004) 
Constant  1.138* 2.072*** 0.677 1.696*** 0.089 0.134 -0.070 -0.084 
 (0.099) (0.002) (0.463) (0.002) (0.594) (0.381) (0.514) (0.400) 
Political Stability  0.304** 0.438** 0.245* 0.466*** 0.073 0.042 0.244 0.232** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.081) (0.002) (0.613) (0.717) (0.145) (0.028) 
Government Expenditure  -0.0008 -0.0006 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.0006 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.776) (0.863) (0.568) (0.824) (0.546) (0.785) (0.707) (0.973) 
Trade  0.001 0.003* -0.0003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0003 
 (0.336) (0.060) (0.935) (0.239) (0.241) (0.131) (0.523) (0.673) 
GDP per capita growth  -0.009 -0.003 -0.020 0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.676) (0.875) (0.451) (0.771) (0.475) (0.748) (0.913) (0.626) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.011 -0.006 --- --- 0.008 0.002 
   (0.653) (0.810)   (0.430) (0.737) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- --- 0.011 -0.001 --- --- 0.003 0.001 
   (0.554) (0.933)   (0.586) (0.755) 
         
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) -1.626 -1.865* -1.199 -1.581 -0.984 -0.908 -0.725 -1.112 
 (0.103) (0.062) (0.230) (0.113) (0.325) (0.363) (0.468) (0.265) 
Sargan OIR 9.496 3.372 11.265 7.483 6.428 5.669 10.231 7.217 
 (0.302) (0.908) (0.187) (0.485) (0.599) (0.684) (0.249) (0.513) 
Wald  (joint) 827.48*** 1184.31*** 2461.93*** 1330.5*** 323.64*** 486.39*** 268.54*** 426.43*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 17 16 19 14 17 16 19 
Countries 21 21 18 18 36 36 28 28 
Observations  70 70 63 63 128 128 100 100 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
brackets.  
 
 
4. Robustness checks 
 In order to establish whether existing levels of corruption and corruption-control influence 
the effect of political stability on corruption and corruption-control respectively, we assess the 
impact of political stability throughout the conditional distributions of corruption and corruption-
control. For this purpose, we employ quantile regressions (QR) on corresponding data without 
non-overlapping intervals.  
 Panel A (B) of Table 2 shows findings on corruption (corruption-control). The purpose of 
including a lagged value of the independent variables in the right-hand-side by one year is to 
mitigate the implication of the biases associated with endogeneity (Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 21).  
For either panel, irrespective of contemporary or non-contemporary specifications, there are 
consistent threshold effects from political stability. A threshold effect in the context of non-
interactive QR is established when estimates corresponding to the independent variable of 
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interest consistently display significant: (i) increasing positive and/or decreasing negative 
magnitudes or (ii) decreasing positive and/or increasing negative magnitudes (Asongu, 2014c). 
The first (second) scenario denotes a positive (negative) threshold effect. From our analysis, the 
positive and negative scenarios are established with respect to corruption-control and corruption 
respectively.  
 Accordingly, given that higher CPI values denote lower levels of corruption, political 
stability decreases corruption with the decreasing magnitude highest in countries where initial 
corruption levels is least. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the political stability estimates are 
consistently significant with decreasing (increasing) magnitudes throughout the conditional 
distributions of corruption (corruption-control). In other words, the positive responsiveness of 
corruption-control to political stability is an increasing function of corruption-control while the 
negative responsiveness of corruption to political stability is a decreasing function of corruption. 
Simply put: a good turn deserves another.  Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Conditional effects of political stability on corruption and corruption-control  
           
 Panel A: Corruption Perception Index(Corruption)  
 Contemporary Non-contemporary 
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
           
Constant  2.18*** 2.757*** 3.326*** 4.435*** 4.952*** 2.21*** 2.43*** 3.42*** 4.06*** 4.91*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability  0.386*** 0.496*** 0.756*** 1.116*** 1.212*** 0.400*** 0.461*** 0.827*** 1.04*** 1.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gov’t Expenditure  -0.004 -0.006 -0.019** -0.010 -0.0004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.018*** 
 (0.425) (0.553) (0.011) (0.188) (0.913) (0.366) (0.558) (0.349) (0.145) (0.000) 
Trade  0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.004* 0.005*** 0.001 0.00009 -0.001 
 (0.137) (0.241) (0.130) (0.624) (0.414) (0.087) (0.000) (0.612) (0.972) (0.539) 
GDPpcg 0.035** 0.022 0.016 -0.0003 -0.009 0.005 0.006 0.030 0.024 0.012 
 (0.022) (0.443) (0.470) (0.990) (0.626) (0.649) (0.504) (0.300) (0.385) (0.529) 
Inflation  -0.004 -0.011 -0.014 0.005 -0.002 -0.0006 -0.010** -0.002   0.007 -0.0001 
 (0.602) (0.317) (0.186) (0.691) (0.729) (0.940) (0.034) (0.844) (0.519) (0.981) 
FDI -0.005 -0.012 0.016 -0.007 -0.020 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.017 
 (0.772) (0.582) (0.438) (0.783) (0.239) (0.734) (0.511) (0.950) (0.957) (0.419) 
           
R²/Pseudo R² 0.270 0.283 0.350 0.400 0.418 0.298 0.319 0.358 0.424 0.445 
Observations  197 197 197 197 197 198 198 198 198 198 
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 Panel B: Corruption-Control  
 Contemporary Non-contemporary 
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
           
Constant  -1.08*** -0.82*** -0.26*** 0.197*** 0.491*** -1.07*** -0.86*** -0.29*** 0.198*** 0.525*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
Political Stability  0.263*** 0.328*** 0.489*** 0.576*** 0.628*** 0.259*** 0.316*** 0.481*** 0.575*** 0.616*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gov’t Expenditure  -0.002 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.002 0.003** -0.002 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.478) (0.903) (0.817) (0.266) (0.026) (0.383) (0.856) (0.866) (0.206) (0.519) 
Trade  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001* -0.001* -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.107) (0.096) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.081) (0.092) (0.000) 
GDPpcg 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.012 0.002 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.188) (0.733) (0.667) (0.000) (0.007) (0.201) (0.794) (0.832) 
Inflation  -0.001 -0.0005 0.002 0.001 0.0008 -0.003** -0.0002 0.002 0.001 0.0003 
 (0.364) (0.776) (0.272) (0.403) (0.531) (0.042) (0.911) (0213) (0.412) (0.838) 
FDI 0.002 -0.008 -0.019** -0.007 0.0001 0.005 -0.009 -0.015 -0.006 0.002 
 (0.737) (0.236) (0.030) (0.253) (0.972) (0.586) (0.234) (0.075) (0.322) (0.680) 
           
R²/Pseudo R² 0.343 0.340 0.371 0.406 0.382 0.341 0.334 0.369 0.404 0.379 
Observations  269 269 269 269 269 261 261 261 261 261 
           
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Gov’t: Government. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where corruption is highest or corruption-control is least. 
 
 
5. Conclusion   
 We have built on existing literature and contemporary challenges to African development 
to assess the role of political stability in fighting corruption and boosting corruption-control in 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010. We have postulated that on the one hand, an 
atmosphere of political instability should increase the confidence of impunity owing to less 
corruption-control. On the other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political 
instability further fuels corruption. Our findings have validated both hypotheses. Hence, contrary 
to a stream of the literature, we have established causal evidence of a positive (negative) nexus 
between political stability/no violence and corruption-control (corruption).  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Corruption  “Corruption Perception Index represents an aggregation 
of perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys”.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Corruption-Control “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests”.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Political Stability/ No 
violence   
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”. 
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Government Expenditure  Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
GDP per capita growth  Gross Domestic Product per capita growth rate (annual 
%) 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Foreign Investment   Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Corruption 3.005 1.064 1.066 6.100 181 
Corruption Control -0.598 0.622 -2.344 0.971 265 
Political Stability  -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
GDP per capita growth rate  2.320 5.016 -11.248 38.258 257 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Foreign Direct Investment  4.706 11.354 -4.112 145.20 202 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
         
PolSta Gov. Exp. Trade  GDPpcg Inflation FDI Corruption C. Control  
1.000 -0.037 0.321 0.071 -0.098 0.012 0.673 0.691 PolSta 
 1.000 -0.070 0.245 -0.243 0.011 -0.095 0.056 Gov. Exp. 
  1.000 0.245 0.024 0.512 0.209 0.194 Trade 
   1.000 -0.105 0.577 0.077 -0.055 GDPpcg 
    1.000 0.041 -0.054 -0.121 Inflation 
     1.000 0.013 -0.045 FDI 
      1.000 0.896 Corruption 
       1.000 C. Control 
         
PolSta: Political Stability. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment. C. Control: Corruption Control.  
 
 
12 
 
References  
Abe K.,  & Wilson, S., (2008). “Governance, Corruption, and Trade in the Asia Pacific  
Region”.  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4731. 
 
Ahlin C.,  & Pang, J., (2008). “Are Financial Development and Corruption Control Substitutes  
in Promoting Growth?”. Journal of Development Economics. 86(2), pp. 414-433. 
 
Aidt, T., (2009). “Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development”. Oxford Review of  
Economic Policy. 25(2), pp. 271-291. 
 
Aidt, T., Dutta, J., & Sena, V., (2008). “Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth:  
Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Comparative Economics. 36, pp. 195-220. 
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2015). “Social Obstacles to Technology, Technological Change, and the 
Economic Growth of African Countries: Some Anecdotal Evidence from Economic History”, 
MPRA Paper No. 63273. 
 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991) “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations” The Review of Economic Studies 58, pp. 
277-297. 
 
Arellano, M., &  Bover, O. (1995) “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models”,  Journal of Econometrics 68, pp. 29-52. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2012). “On the effect of foreign aid on corruption”, Economics Bulletin, 32(3), 
pp. 2174-2180.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013a). “Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count: what 
do wealth-effects tell us in Africa?”, Institutions and Economies, 5(3), pp. 53-74.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013b). “Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption control-levels 
matter?”, International Journal of Development Issues, 12(1), pp. 36-52.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013c). “On the effectiveness of foreign aid in institutional quality”, European 
Econnomic Letters, 2(1), pp. 12-19. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013d). “Harmonizing IPRs on Software Piracy: Empirics of Trajectories in 
Africa”, Journal of Business Ethics, 118(1), pp. 45-60. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014a). “On the substitution of institutions and finance in investment”, 
Economics Bulletin, 34(3), pp. 1557-1574.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b). “Globalization, (fighting) corruption and development: how are these 
phenomena linearly and nonlinearly related in wealth-effects?”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
41(3), pp. 346-369.  
 
13 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014c). “Financial development dynamic thresholds of financial globalisation: 
evidence from Africa”, Journal of Economics Studies, 41(2), pp. 166-195.  
 
Asongu, S. A., Efobi, U., & Beecroft, I., (2015). “FDI, Aid, Terrorism: Conditional Threshold 
Evidence from Developing Countries”, African Governance and Development Institute Working 
Paper  No. 15/019, Yaoundé. 
 
Asongu, S. A.,  & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2013). “Crimes and Conflicts in Africa: Consequences of 
Corruption”, European Economics Letters, 2(2), pp. 50-55. 
 
Asongu, S. A.,  & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2015). “Is Poverty in the African DNA(Gene)?”, African 
Governance and Development Institute Working Paper No. 15/011, Yaoundé.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2016). “Fighting African Conflicts and Crimes: Which 
Governance Tools Matter?”, International Journal of Social Economics: Forthcoming.   
 
Asongu, S. A., & Jellal, M., (2013). “On the channels of foreign aid to corruption”, Economics 
Bulletin, 33(3), pp. 2191-2201.  
 
Asongu, A. A., & Nwachukwu, J., (2015). “Revolution Empirics: Predicting the Arab Spring”, 
Empirical Economics: Forthcoming.  
 
Aysan, F., Nabli, K., &  Veganzones-Varoudakis, A., (2007). “Governance institutions and 
private investment: An application to the MENA”. Developing Economies. 45(3), pp. 339- 
377. 
 
Azfar, O., (2005). “Corruption et criminalité, in: Transparency International, Rapport  
mondial sur la corruptio”,  Economica, Paris, pp. 358-361. 
 
Azfar, O.,  & Gurgur, T., (2004). “Crime, Crime reporting and Governance”, mimeo, IRIS 
University of  Maryland, College Park. 
 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M., and Ndikumana, L. (2008), “Corruption and Growth: Exploring the  
Investment Channel”, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.  
 
Barbier, B., (2010). “Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: 
A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa”. Environmental & Resource Economics. 
46(4), pp. 511-537. 
 
Blackburn, K., Neanidis Kyriakos, C., & Haque, E., (2008). “Corruption, Seigniorage and 
Growth: Theory and Evidence”. CESinfo Working Paper No. 2354. 
 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S., (1998). “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel 
data models”  Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), pp. 115-143. 
 
Bond, S., Hoeffler, A., & Tample, J. (2001) “GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models”, 
University of Oxford.  
14 
 
 
Brunetti, A., Kisunko, G., & Weder, B., (1998). “Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from a World Wide Private Sector Survey”. The World Bank Economic Review. 
12(3), pp. 353-384. 
 
De la Croix D., & Delavallade C., (2007). “Corruption et allocation optimale de 
l'investissement public”. Revue économique. 58(3), pp. 637-647. 
 
De Rosa, D., Gooroochurn, N., & Görg, H., (2010). “Corruption and Productivity. Firm-level 
Evidence from the BEEPS Survey”. Policy Research Working Paper  No. 5348. 
 
Delavallade, C., (2006). “Corruption and Distribution of public spending in Developing  
Countries”. Journal of Economics and Finance. 30(2), pp. 222-239. 
 
Dincer, C., & Gunalp, B., (2008). “Corruption, Income Inequality, and Poverty in the United 
States”. Working Papers No. 54. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.    
 
Dreher A., &  Herzfeld, T., (2005). “The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New 
Evidence”. Mimeo. 
 
Dzhumashev, R., (2009). “Is there a direct Effect of Corruption on Growth?”, MPRA Paper 
No. 18489. 
 
Everhart, S., Martinez-Vazquez, J.,  & McNab, M., (2009). “Corruption, Governance, 
Investment and Growth in Emerging Markets”.  Applied Economics. 41(13),  pp. 1579-1594. 
 
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., &  Zoido-Lobaton, P., (2000). “Dodging the Grabbing 
Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries”.  Journal of Public  
Economics. 76, pp. 459-493. 
 
Ghura, D., (1998). “Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa - Effects of Economic Policies and 
Corruption”. IMF Working Papers No. 98/135. 
 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., &  Alonso-Terme, R., (2002). “Does Corruption Affect Income 
Inequality and Poverty?”. Economics of Governance. 3, pp. 23-45. 
 
Gupta, S., de Mello, L., & Sharan, R., (2001). “Corruption and Military Spending”. European 
Journal of Political Economy. 17(4), pp. 749-777. 
 
Gyimah-Brempong, K., (2002). “Corruption, Economic Growth and Income Inequality in 
Africa”. Economics of Governance. 3, pp. 183-209. 
 
Gyimah-Brempong, K., De Camacho,  &  Samaria, M., (2006). “Corruption, Growth, and 
 Income Distribution: Are there Regional Differences?”. Economics of Governance. 7(3), 
 pp. 245-269. 
 
Haque, M.,  & Kneller, R., (2008). “Public Investment and Growth: The Role of Corruption”. 
15 
 
Centre for Growth & Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series No 098. 
Houston, H., (2007). “Can Corruption Ever Improve An Economy?” Cato Journal. 27(3), 
pp. 325-342. 
 
Kodila-Tekida, O., (2012a). “Empirical survey on the causes of corruption”. MPRA Paper, 
No. 41484.  
 
Kodila-Tekida, O., (2012b). “Consequences of corruption: empirical survey”. MPRA Paper 
No. 41482. 
 
Kodila-Tedika, O., & Bolito-Losembe, R., (2014). “Corruption et Etats fragile africains”, African 
Development Review, 26(1), pp. 50-58.  
 
Li, H., Xu, C., &  Zou, H.-F., (2000). “Corruption, Income Distribution and Growth”. 
Economics and Politics. 12(2), pp. 155-182. 
 
Mauro, P., (1995). “Corruption and growth”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110(3),  
pp. 681-712. 
 
Mauro, P., (1997). The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government 
Expenditure: A Cross–Country Analysis”, in: Elliot, Corruption and the Global Economy, 
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics), pp. 83-107. 
 
Méon, P. G., & Weill, L., (2010). “Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?” World Development. 
38(3), pp. 244-259. 
 
Mlachila, M., Tapsoba, R., & Tapsoba, S. J. A., (2014). “A Quality of Growth Index for 
Developing Countries: A Proposal”, IMF Working Paper No. 14/172, Washington. 
 
Mo, H., 2001. “Corruption and Economic Growth”. Journal of Comparative Economics. 29, 
pp. 66-79. 
 
Mokaddem, L., (2010). “La corruption compromet la réalisation de l’éducation pour tous?: les 
canaux de transmission”. Presented at the European Seminar, Study Visit 11 mars 2010. 
 
Pellegrini, L., & Gerlagh, R., (2004). “Corruption’s Effect on Growth and its Transmission 
Channels”. Kylos. 57, pp. 429-456. 
 
Smith, J., Muir, J., Walpole, J., Balmford, A., & Leader-Williams, N., (2003). “Governance 
and the Loss of Biodiversity”. Nature. 426, pp. 67-70. 
 
Tanzi, V.,  & Davoodi, H., (1997). “Corruption, Public Investment and Growth”. IMF 
Working Paper, No. 97/139. 
 
Ugur, M.,  &  Dasgupta, N., (2011). “Corruption and Economic Growth: A Meta-analysis of 
the Evidence on Low-Income Countries and Beyond”. MPRA Paper No. 31226. 
 
16 
 
Wei, S.-J., (2000a). “Natural Openness and Good Government”. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2411. 
 
Wei, S.-J., (2000b). “Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises”. World 
Bank Working Paper No. 2429.  
 
Wei, S.-J.,  & Wu, Y., (2001). “Negative Alchemy? Corruption, Composition of Capital 
Flows, and Currency Crises”. NBER Working Paper No. 8187. 
 
Welsch, H., (2004). “Corruption, Growth and the Environment: A Cross-Country Analysis”. 
Environment and Development Economics. 9, pp. 663-693. 
 
You, J.-S., &  Khagram, S., (2005). “Inequality and Corruption”. American Sociological 
Review. 70(1), pp. 136-157.  
 
